Ageing, perpetual perishing and the event as pure novelty: Péguy, Whitehead and Deleuze on time and history [draft of 15/11/2008] 1
2 to him, before finally waving his eyes shut, tired and short of glory in a cool forecast of the event of his death, then Deleuze's masterly and many-jewelled time-machine cannot run as freely as he lets us believe. It cannot run on the eternal return of pure difference and instead must accept another of the tropes of Péguy's verse. Everything acquires a patina of age. Even the new must bend to this law, because the new carries the law; it is how we experience loss of sheen and of purity. The new is the return of ageing, but even more, it is its inflation. History is a bloated and slowing cycle: its subjects grow evermore tired on their way to final collapse. According to Péguy's reading of historical cycles, the rejuvenating circle of time at the heart of Deleuze's philosophy cannot function as a machine for the production of pure novelty, because the circle itself runs according to a process of ageing. In Cinema 2, Deleuze describes film as such a machine where film makers like Rossellini attempt to give us back a belief in this world against the modern 'fact' of loss of belief (Deleuze 1985, 223) . The key is to affirm a belief in the world and our relation to it without promising a better world. Péguy's counter-claim is that even this attempt can only deepen the loss when it too comes to fail, because it not belief in a better world that is at fault, but rather that no gesture can renovate our relation to the world without betraying or ageing earlier beliefs.
Against this ageing world, obliterating the drag of its historical memory and the necessary slowing implied by its filling, the eternal return of the new is Deleuze's metaphysical gift to modernism. It frees the modern world of the error of hope, dependent on shackling the new to particular time-bound and treacherous figures, while retaining the life affirming power of novel events. Yet, counter to hopeful self-deceivers or innocents, Péguy describes revolutions as betrayed when we seek either to preserve them or to repeat them against a necessary fading not only back into their time, but also in our blunt readings which cover it with layers of distorting sediment. No doubt Deleuze would agree with this denunciation of false repetitions. He borrows Péguy's account of the fall of the Bastille and his study of Monet's Nymphéas from Clio, as two of the first entrances into repetition for itself in Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1968, 8 ). Yet he also elides Péguy's sense of the tragedy hovering and waiting to descend later in history, as even good repetitions or good revolutions become tangled with terrible reckonings 2 .
Péguy's book is haunted by the battle of Waterloo, where the true heart of the revolution, the revolutionary people, was led to sacrifice:
It was then that it was this people sensing that nothing would resist it, this people that could not restrain itself from involvement, that felt its blood rushing, that felt itself called towards those first windmills on that mound and through twenty-three years of the greatest epic ever played in the world towards that last farm on the edge of that wood towards that plane on the heights of Hougoumont.
From that cannonade where everything was to begin, to that nightfall where everything was to end (Péguy 1932, 115) . 3 Having invoked Clio, Deleuze pays homage with one of his most simple lines on repetition: 'The head is the organ of exchanges, but the heart, the loving organ of 4 repetition.' Péguy, though, fears for this heart and sees the remnants of the revolution hurtling with enthusiasm towards the farm attacked at the start of the battle of Waterloo and then on to the failed charges against British, Dutch and Prussian lines where thousands would die and a retreat would begin, ending with the restoration of monarchy. But I know that there is ageing. The ageing of every man and the ageing of the whole world. Real duration, my friend, the one that will always be called Bergsonian duration, organic duration, the duration of the event and of reality essentially implies ageing. Ageing is essentially organic. Ageing is incorporated at the very heart of the organism. To be born, to grow, to age, to become and to die, to grow and to decline, are all one; it is the same movement; the same organic 6 gesture; it is what the ancients excellently call the domain of corruption (Péguy 1932, 53 showing its life draining away or distorting through inept modern receptions:
Following Hugo in Les misérables
Thus is the common historical measure, the common historical and even mechanical misfortune, the common temporal misfortune of the work or the temporal event, of the historical work and event, that is, of the recorded work and event. Briseis is in our hands. It is a great danger for her. It is a great danger for Achilles. It is exactly from that interior contrariety that the entire temporal is wormy, my poor friend, the historic, everything historic is wormy, the event is wormy, the work, that integrating part of the event, is wormy. Thus is my deep wound, my temporal wound, my eternally temporal wound (Péguy 1932, 32 ).
Péguy's gloomy and necrotic argument is then not that there cannot be novelty.
It is rather that all novelty is born fading because its intensity comes from life as duration 7
and not from an eternal quality or substance. Homer's Briseis and Achilles are set organically into their time, never fully to return and only to be misinterpreted and misunderstood. Their living intensity requires this inscription, but one that must always betray it through material wasting. It also requires a reception, but one that must always bury the work and its intensities through a necessary ignorance and blunted senses. Deleuze's synthesis of the pure past, we have a concurrent synthesis of the pure future; they grow old together. To age in the past is to become tarnished; to age in the future is lose even the possibility of acquiring luster. Not only must any field necessarily become crowded, but wherever an event is situated on the two facing cones, it is subject to a process of ageing as a becoming smaller and as a loss of significance. We moderns experience this in terms of our growing individual worthlessness and the many psychic commotions caused by the struggle to satisfy an ambition that grows stronger because it is thwarted, paradoxically, in a world where fame has become a benchmark and a commodity. Péguy sees this as a problem of generations. Each successive generation is a lesser part of a growing tree and less able to find glory. His reasoning again depends on the necessity of a reception, in this case, of judges capable of esteeming and preserving our actions. Trapped in the past, each generation finds itself pleading to too few future judges among too many past appellants (the first cone with its leading point). As present, each generation is not only falling away into a growing field of future appellants but also looking into a future of lesser judges struggling for worth against the growing past (the second cone, leading with its expanding base). When past generations age and multiply, future ones lose all opportunity for discerning judges and thereby become poor judges for the past. Every generation is betrayed in this process:
On the very day of its death, it enters into competition with every effaced generation, with every fallen generation, with every appellant generation: with every dead generation. But not only that: soon, tomorrow, it enters into competition, as appellant generation, with more new appellant generations, with ceaselessly new appellant generations, that is, with those very generations, those generations that one took for judges and that will tomorrow die (Péguy 1932, 166-67) .
The call for judges is a need for memory and commemoration. Memory carries Péguy's argument, since it is memory that transports ageing from the past and into the future. For him, there can be no movement of time as duration without memory, but this very faculty is one of dustiness and fading. Duration requires recording, but recording ages past durations and new ones alike by yoking them together. History is essentially ageing, because it depends on memory. Its agony is not of the dusty irrelevant archive, but rather of the significant event ineluctably losing heirs to its significance, not by rarity or ignorance, but by a necessary superabundance of predestined mediocrity. Should we need a contemporary sign of these processes, they lie in the ever-increasing energies devoted to publicity rather than creation, in the struggle to pass from private originality to recognized excellence.
Below the paragraph from Clio quoted at length by Deleuze in Difference and
Repetition and in Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1969, 68 ; Deleuze 1968, 245) we therefore find a severe counter to his account of the eternal return of pure difference, but also to his interpretation of that key passage. Deleuzian metaphysicians could have engineered their way round the problem of ageing with the formula 'only difference returns and never the same'. When challenged about the implied lack of continuity needed for meaningful history, they could then retort that the same returns, but as different, offering a continuity of change. But Péguy's argument troubles this ingenuity with acute questions: What records the difference? What is the measure of difference, if not some memory of what has faded? Is not memory itself this gauge and ever-changing archive? It is conceded that the same never returns, or rather necessarily returns as different, but it is how it is different that marks the split between believers in novelty and those who see the ageing of the world in the return of difference. Péguy's argument is sophisticated and knowing, for it addresses the purity sought by Deleuze in the return of difference to show that purity itself is a concept that ages and that depends on ageing its surroundings. This difference over the significance of purity is played out in the examples they give of purity. For Péguy, Sleeping Beauty is a pure but doomed beauty with the fate of keeping perfection against ageing but at the cost of a cut away from the world. For Deleuze, Alice's perfection is one of multiple becomings, rather than ultimate stasis. He is attracted to Alice for her multiple changes in direction and scale, spreading confusion in linear motion. For Péguy the perverse attraction of Sleeping Beauty is in the terrible message she brings to those who look upon her or seek to compete, but more terribly still in her own tragic inner fallibility: when perfect she is detached from her world, when brought back to it, she begins ageing and losing her perfection. The signs of novelty and novelty itself are not the purest returnees, because they break on the nonsense of this relative purity. If pure becoming occurs, if its emergence as charted by Deleuze in his reading of Péguy is validated, it is at the cost of a memory verifying and therefore disproving that purity. This is pure ageing:
So long as the interior articulations of the event are marked by external articulations, by articulations of relief, by political articulations, by historical articulations that draw them, that are supposed to represent them and that represent them more or less faithfully, so long as we see those surface breaks, those mountains formed by folding, those contractions, we can give ourselves the pleasure of believing that we still understand something of it. But when there is nothing left to grasp, we feel that we are in ageing itself, and in pure ageing.
Nothing comes to disguise the surface of that irreversible river. (Péguy 1932, 269-70 Nothing is as mysterious, she said, as these points of deep conversion, as these upheavals, as these profound renewals. It is the very secret of the event. We were struggling with this problem. And we were getting nowhere. And it maddened us
[…] And it aged us. And then all of a sudden nothing has happened and we are a new people, in a new world, with a new mankind (Péguy 1932, 269 When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which everyone clearly experiments in himself, while he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year; of which duration of things, while he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to have no distance (Locke 1989, 90 Péguy's bias towards ageing in the relation between the two processes: 'Thus each actual thing is only to be understood in terms of its becoming and perishing. There is no halt in which the actuality is just its static self, accidentally played upon by qualifications derived from the shift in circumstances' (Whitehead 1948, 316) . In fact, in the simple version of Whitehead's process philosophy as set out in Adventures of Ideas, Péguy's main point is confirmed because Whitehead's process depends on the return of ideas, a return Péguy would rightly see as insipid and sad because the idea returns bereft of the original physical and emotional durations that gave it its singular and glorious role at a particular time. Moreover, Péguy's point on the crowding of ideas and the attendant devaluation of physical and sensual attainment seems to hold firm against Whitehead's apparent idealism: 'This process involves a physical side which is the perishing of the past as it transforms itself into a new creation. It also involves a mental side which is the Soul entertaining ideas' (Whitehead 1948, 317 There are no real independent actual entities, only processes of different kinds related in different ways according to perishing and becoming. The creative push in any novel process is there merely through the fact of its novelty and not any creating intellect. The deduction of the presence of a past 'idea' follows from a dependent process-based connection to a perished occasion, rather than a particular mental memory:
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The process is itself the actuality and requires no antecedent static cabinet. Also, the processes of the past, in their perishing, are themselves energizing as the complex origin of each novel occasion. The past is the reality at the base of each new actuality. The process is its absorption into a new unity with ideals and with anticipation, by the operation of the creative Eros (Whitehead 1948, 318 ).
The unnecessary cabinet described here, is that of prior unchanging substances supposedly underpinning concrete reality. There is process and nothing but process, and substance only leads to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness where unchanging metaphysical substance is taken as concrete as opposed to processes of becoming:
the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete' (Whitehead 1927, 64) . Any abstraction is an error, if it leads to the conclusion that it allows us to reach a selfsufficient entity. Therefore a statement such as 'what is past is past' is necessarily false for Whitehead, because the past is also in the process of future becoming as creative of novelty.
These conclusions are not simply metaphysical positions in Adventures of Ideas; they take on profound historical and moral roles. The two are hard to distinguish in Whitehead, since his approach to history is in terms of moral progress and decline. His argument is that due to perpetual perishing historical moments must pass away: that is, they cannot be preserved as abstract entities as the basis for any conservatism. He is therefore profoundly progressive. Given the necessary passing, and given its form as the impossibility of returning as the same, the future necessarily recreates the past it prehends or is in process with. History is then a process of decline and renewal. This latter creative moment is the adventure from the title of his book: 'Without adventure civilization is in full decay' (Whitehead 1948, 321) . But again this does nothing to refute Péguy's claim which, translated into Whitehead's terminology, is that adventure itself is a process of ageing because the weight and extent of process increases in cycles of perishing and becoming, squeezing out the potential for novelty in the creative moment. Péguy's Clio trains us to detect the latent signs of the discouragement of ageing, even in Whitehead's profoundly hopeful book: 'Also let us hope that our present epoch is to be viewed as a period of change to a new direction of civilization, involving in its dislocations a minimum of human misery. And yet surely the misery of the Great War was sufficient for any change of epoch' (Whitehead 1948, 320) . importance. There may be no pain or conscious loss. There is merely a slow paralysis of surprise. And apart from surprise, intensity of feeling collapses (Whitehead 1948, 328) .
Confronting this staleness and collapse full face, peace does not deny them, but rather maintains a confidence in novelty despite them through a sense of the harmony between loss and creation. This harmony is achieved through the belief that creation can counter-balance tragedy, rather than eliminate it. This is not a hope in perpetual progress, nor is it the belief in the impossibility of the return of decay. It is rather the conclusion that novelty can live up to the task of moving beyond each tragic event and the growing reserve of all tragedies:
Amid the passing of so much beauty, so much heroism, so much daring, Peace is then the intuition of permanence. It keeps vivid the sensitiveness to the tragedy;
and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal -What might have been and was not: What can be (Whitehead 1948, 329) .
In Adventures of Ideas, this argument does not rise to the detail of why that which has perished can become again and not perish in the same way or worse in the form of cycle feared and charted by Péguy. We are therefore left with an emotive claim that without doubt conveys great nobility and wisdom. It also has some basis in historical examples as rotting states find new potential or give way to novel ones. The claim therefore has inductive strength, but it will depend greatly on contemporary moods and historical selection and interpretation. It is not enough to counter the logic of Péguy's arguments on history and time.
Such counters may be available in Process and Reality. This much more rigorous development of Whitehead's process philosophy gives a similar prominence to the idea of perpetual perishing and introduces an important and useful distinction from the outset.
Perishing has a dual quality whereby the actual and ideal aspects of process pass away differently. If we accept that real process involves actual physical prehensions, alongside real ideal ones, such as the ideas and values running alongside physical situations, then we can see that while actual physical relations perish, the ideas, though also changing with that passing, are available to be taken up in new ideas in a different way. For example, ideas about laws and about social goods can connect to, make possible and give impetus or critical resistance to new technical changes, even though the physical manifestations of technology continually pass into dust. Despite the startling changes that take place in industrial landscapes as they are redeveloped, ideas and values associated with these forms of industry are ready for novel contexts, in a nostalgic reworking, say, or in progressive vows never to return to past horrors, or in new interpretations of original models. For Whitehead, real process necessarily involves ideas and actual occasions. To concentrate on one or the other is then an abstraction which, though perhaps necessary for the representation of ideas and actual occasions, only ever gives an incomplete account of process.
Whitehead bases his distinction on the difference in determination between the two sides of the process. The actual physical occasion is fully determined by its prehensions, that is, the physical relations of dependency in processes of transformation of one occasion by another (for instance, in the way one being takes another as food). All of these pass with the occasions. But the ideas are much less determined and can be taken up in new nexūs (loosely, networks of processes):
Actual occasions in their 'formal' constitutions are devoid of all indetermination.
Potentiality has passed into realization. They are complete and determinate matter of fact, devoid of all indecision. They form the ground of obligation. But eternal objects, and propositions, and some complex forms of contrast, involve in their own nature indecision. They are, like all entities, potentials for the process of becoming (Whitehead 1978, 29) .
The argument is quite subtle here, because Whitehead is careful not to separate fully actual occasions and ideas, or more precisely, eternal objects, as necessarily connected sides to any process. Instead, they are distinguished in a more graded way through their potential for becoming, as grounded in the nature of their determination. Stengers has pointed out, God underwrites novelty as resistance to ageing, not as an external agent, nor as a final cause, but as an immanent process whereby eternal objects return in new occasions free of the perishing they were attached to in earlier events (Stengers 2002, 497-528) . The irreversibility of time depends on this character' (Whitehead 1978, 237 ). Deleuze's solution to this paradox is a split in time between a time focused on the present and on physical wounds and mixtures, Chronos, and a time focused on the past and on the future, and on fluctuations in intensity and significance, Aiôn (Deleuze 1969, 190-98) . The relation between the two times is paradoxical because they interact with one another, but cannot be reduced to shared laws -causal laws, for example. We therefore have a time where the past and the future are drawn into the present and subject to the effects it has as it passes away and moves into the future, for example, in an archduke's wound and death.
We also, though, have a time where the significance of that wound is always open to being replayed in terms of its intensity and therefore its effects, for instance in a historical work robbing the death of its privileged position in explanation of the causal processes A simple example can illustrate this complex structure and its resistance to Péguy's ageing and Whitehead's redeemed perishing. Take your most familiar walk and change it at a random point. The event at the change alters the causal capacity of the prior and later actual points. What they can do changes because their relation to other points has changed (you'll never see the later points and earlier ones lose, for example, their soothing quality because they now prepare for the change). The event also alters relations of significance and value associated with the points on the walk (the thrill of birdsong or the reassurance of a diesel-fuelled hubbub might be replaced by the soothing of running water or the irritation of silence). The apparently innocuous change in a walk alters conditions back in time, but is also itself conditioned by past times. There is therefore never a pure ageing, since the present is a form of novelty that can change what it ages from. Neither though is there a pure perishing of actual events saved by the return of eternal objects in new events, because the relation of the eternal to past occurrences is set in play again in each novel event -forward and back in time. Office. Only as one came to know them gradually year after year did one even remotely understand how Eric's loss was felt. Finally they could talk of him eagerly and with laughter, but Whitehead once said that the most vivid wordings of grief or attempts at consolation by those masters of speech, the English poets, to him "only trivialized the actual emotions"' (Price 2001, 7) . 9 Note that according to Stengers, Whitehead's immanent God is secular rather than an external source of religious values, paradigms or laws.
